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I. INTRODUCTION

My favorite bit of folk wisdom is “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
However, when considering the ongoing revisions to the Model Penal
Code: Sentencing (MPCS) provisions, a corollary comes to mind: “fix
what’s really broke, and don’t risk breaking what ain’t really broke.”
Unfortunately, the MPCS revisions fail to address what is really broken in
modern American sentencing systems, and they overlook enduring (and
still timely) wisdom found in the original MPCS. Thus, I view the MPCS
revision as at best, a missed opportunity; at worst, the codification of
problematic modern sentencing dynamics.
The MPCS revision starts with the premise that the original MPCS
provisions are broken. The Reporter’s Introduction states that although the
original MPCS provisions “were a vast improvement over pre-existing
American Law, they were built on assumptions that have fallen into
uncertainty or disfavor.”1 Stressing the “weakening of rehabilitation as the
general justificatory aim of punishment” and modern structures designed to
regulate and regularize discretionary sentencing decisions, the MPCS
revision asserts that “the architecture of the 1962 Code’s sentencing
provisions no longer fits current realities.”2
As a descriptive matter, the original MPCS is dated by its endorsement
of judges and parole officials having broad discretionary authority to tailor
sentences to each individual offender’s unique rehabilitative needs. But, as
a normative matter, it is not obvious that either the theoretical
* William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
2. Id.
709
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commitments or the structural architecture of the original MPCS is dated or
broken. Indeed, because the current realities of mass imprisonment and
sentencing severity are the real problems with modern systems, the
American Law Institute (ALI) should focus on refreshing some of the
wisest aspects of the original MPCS.
Not only does the MPCS revision fail to champion some enduring
wisdom to be found in the original MPCS, it also fails to address
effectively the structural and social forces that have fueled the severity
revolution that now defines most modern sentencing and punishment
schemes. Indeed, I fear the MPCS revision risks legitimating and reifying
the social, political, and legal forces that have helped make the United
States the world’s leader in incarceration and other extreme punishments.
Rather than seeking to codify what might seem like best practices of
modern reforms that are leading us in the wrong direction, the ALI should
be speaking out forcefully about modern injustices and should be using its
prestige and authority to try to radically redirect the United States’
sentencing attitudes and practices.
II. WHAT’S TRULY BROKEN IN MODERN PUNISHMENT AND
SENTENCING
The Reporter’s Introduction to the revised sentencing provisions
acknowledges the “near quintupling of the incarceration rate from 1970 to
2005” and also “the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations
through the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.”3 But there is no explicit
statement or even implicit acknowledgment in the MPCS revision that the
extraordinary modern growth in the American imprisonment rates is
conceptually problematic in a nation “conceived in Liberty.”4 Nor does the
revision grapple with the fact that mass incarceration is so practically
problematic due to the extreme economic and social costs imposed on
offender populations and society as a whole.
As I have noted in an earlier work,5 although wrongful convictions and
the death penalty regularly capture the attention of academics and the
media, America’s modern affinity for locking people in cages has yet to
become a regular aspect of political, scholarly, or public dialogues.
Although a few academics and public policy groups are starting to examine
the causes and consequences of modern mass incarceration with increased
urgency,6 neither the scope nor the dire nature of the mass incarceration
3. Id. at xxvii, xxix.
4. See Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19,
1863), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/images/Gettysburg-2.jpg.
5. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Extreme Punishment, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE
OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 163, 163 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
6. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006); MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO
INCARCERATE 1 (1999); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA xi (2007); see
also THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ONE IN 100: BEHIND
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problem in the United States has garnered sufficient attention.
An accounting of a few basic statistics highlights why mass
incarceration and extreme prison punishments are the most pressing
modern sentencing problems in the United States.7 A recent report from the
Vera Institute of Justice provides this quantification of America’s growing
eagerness for locking up its populace:
Between 1970 and 2005, state and federal authorities
increased prison populations by 628 percent. By 2005, more
than 1.5 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on
any given day, and an additional 750,000 were incarcerated in
local jails. By the turn of the 21st century, more than 5.6
million living Americans had spent time in a state or federal
prison—nearly 3 percent of the U.S. population.8
Disconcertingly, these increases in prison populations seem unlikely to
reverse course anytime soon as the overall population of incarcerated
individuals nationwide hits record highs each year,9 and sophisticated
projections suggest these numbers are likely to continue upward.10
When placed in a global perspective, the unprecedented growth in
American imprisonment is especially stunning. A far higher proportion of
adults is imprisoned in the United States than in any other country in the
entire world.11 Our incarceration rate, which is nearly 750 individuals per
100,000 in the population, is now roughly five to ten times the rate of most
other Western industrialized nations.12 Indeed, our prison population and
incarceration rates surpass even those of countries that have long been
viewed as particularly disrespectful of human rights:

BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008) [hereinafter PEW CENTER, ONE IN 100], available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/
one_in_100.pdf (discussing incarceration levels in the United States).
7. Indeed, given the racial, social, and economic inequalities reflected in and reinforced by
modern incarceration patterns, mass incarceration and extreme prison punishments are now the
nation’s most pressing modern civil rights problems. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2009).
8. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p
07.pdf.
9. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2008),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf.
10. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PUBLIC SAFETY,
PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007–2011, at 1 (2007), available
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State-based_policy/PSPP_
prison_projections_0207.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The U.S. imprisons significantly more people than any other
nation. China ranks second, imprisoning 1.5 million of its
much larger citizen population. The U.S. also leads the world
in incarceration rates, well above Russia and Cuba, which
have the next highest rates of 607 and 487 per 100,000.
Western European countries have incarceration rates that
range from 78 to 145 per 100,000.13
While these statistics reveal the basic dimensions of modern mass
incarceration in the United States, drilling deeper into the numbers
provides an even more disconcerting snapshot of America’s affinity for
extreme imprisonment terms. For example, a study by The Sentencing
Project documents an extraordinary growth in offenders serving life terms:
The 127,677 lifers in prison [as of 2003] represent an increase
of 83% from the number of lifers nationally in 1992, which in
turn had doubled since 1984. During the 1990s the growth of
persons serving life without parole has been even more
precipitous, an increase of 170%, between 1992 and 2003.
Overall, one of every six lifers in 1992 was serving a sentence
of life without parole. By 2003, that proportion had increased
to one in four.
Moreover, the number of long-term prisoners is
considerably greater than just the total number of lifers and
contributes to the population of what can be considered
“virtual lifers”–persons serving very long sentences or
consecutive sentences that often outlast the person’s natural
life. One 2000 study estimated that more than one of every
four (27.5%) adult prisoners was serving a sentence of twenty
years or more. Further, data from the Department of Justice
show that as of 2002, state and federal prisons held 121,000
persons aged fifty or over, more than double the figure of a
decade earlier.14
These sobering statistics indicate that there are now more individuals
nearly certain to die in American prisons than there were in the total United
States’ prison population at the time the original MPCS provisions were
developed. Furthermore, female offenders, non-violent drug offenders, and
mentally ill offenders have now become a significant portion of the
population sentenced to life terms.15 Moreover, as another recent report
documents, American jurisdictions are uniquely willing to sentence even
juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole:
13. Id.
14. MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON
SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 11 (2004).
15. Id. at 1.
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[T]here are currently at least 2,225 people incarcerated in the
United States who have been sentenced to spend the rest of
their lives in prison for crimes they committed as
children . . . . Before 1980, life without parole was rarely
imposed on children. . . .
Virtually all countries in the world reject the punishment of
life without parole for child offenders. At least 132 countries
reject life without parole for child offenders in domestic law
or practice. And all countries except the United States and
Somalia have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which explicitly forbids “life imprisonment without
possibility of release” for “offenses committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.” Of the 154 countries for which
Human Rights Watch was able to obtain data, only three
currently have people serving life without parole for crimes
they committed as children, and it appears that those three
countries combined have only about a dozen such cases.16
Though not quite as dramatic and life-defining as incarceration, novel
and highly consequential forms of liberty deprivation in the United States
are an aspect of daily life for millions more American citizens now
confined to prison or jail cells. Currently, well over five million persons
are serving probation, parole, or some other form of post-release
supervision,17 and certain classes of offenders have become modern
pariahs subject to new types of extreme social control. For example,
hundreds of thousands of sex offenders not only must register their
movements with authorities, but are literally banished from living or even
coming near many regions of the country.18
Finally, beyond the extremely large number of persons formally subject
to criminal justice control in the United States, former offenders in
virtually every American jurisdiction suffer a range of punitive collateral
consequences that serve as a persistent sort of shadow imprisonment. As
one recent report explains:
In every U.S. jurisdiction, the legal system erects formidable
barriers to the reintegration of criminal offenders into free
society. When a person is convicted of a crime, that person
16. AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
1, 2, 5 (2005), available at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/countries/usa/clwop/report.pdf.
17. See GLAZE & BONCZAR, supra note 9, at 1.
18. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on
Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 101, 103–04 (2007); see also Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional
Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (discussing
the political appeal of exclusion laws and the likelihood that they will be applied to other exoffender subpopulations in the future).
FOR C HILD O FFENDERS IN THE U NITED S TATES
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becomes subject to a host of legal disabilities and penalties
under state and federal law. These so-called collateral
consequences of conviction may continue long after the courtimposed sentence has been fully served . . . [and] a criminal
record can be grounds for exclusion from many benefits and
opportunities, including employment in education, health
care, and transportation. . . . These legal barriers are always
difficult and often impossible to overcome, so that persons
convicted of a crime can expect to carry the collateral
disabilities and stigma of conviction to their grave, no matter
how successful their efforts to rehabilitate themselves.19
This brief review of various facets of modern mass incarceration and
extreme social control in the United States only begins to document what is
most badly broken in America’s current punishment and sentencing
schemes. But this summary overview highlights why I question the notion
that the original MPCS’ theories and structures are what need to be fixed.
In my view, the stunning expansion of United States imprisonment rates
and other extreme punishments, along with the costs and consequences of
mass incarceration and other forms of government deprivations of liberty,
should be the preeminent concern for anyone assessing the theories and
structures of modern sentencing systems. Moreover, as explained in the
next Part, the theoretical underpinnings and social consequences of
structured sentencing reforms embraced by the MPCS revision may further
contribute to America’s modern affinity for locking more and more people
behind bars.
III. AS A MATTER OF THEORY, THE MPCS REVISION BREAKS
WHAT DOESN’T NEED FIXING
As mentioned above, the MPCS revision rightly notes that the original
MPCS provisions “were built on assumptions that have fallen into
uncertainty or disfavor.”20 But the MPCS revision neglects to highlight that
the “assumptions” of the rehabilitative model of sentencing and corrections
in the original MPCS were fundamentally progressive. They reflected an
ultimate commitment that governments should focus the state’s awesome
and coercive power at sentencing on helping offenders become law-abiding
citizens through rehabilitative programming. Further, the MPCS revision
fails to acknowledge, and perhaps even fails to recognize, that these
“assumptions” may have played an important role, at least indirectly, in
preventing the extreme increases in prison populations and liberty

19. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL
CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE ix–x (2006).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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deprivations that have come to characterize modern American sentencing
and punishment systems.
A complicated set of political and social factors have contributed to
modern mass incarceration;21 new attitudes and prevailing sentencing
theories are only part of this story. Still, it is unlikely coincidental that
incarceration rates have increased dramatically and punishments have
become much harsher during the same era in which the progressive
“assumptions” of rehabilitative theory have been eschewed. Moreover, the
MPCS revision essentially seeks to put the final nail in the coffin of the
rehabilitative ideal by formally embracing the theory of “limiting
retributivism” as the best and dominant philosophy for modern sentencing
systems.22 With its embrace of limiting retributivism, the MPCS revision
never confronts or even directly considers the possibility that the
movement away from rehabilitative commitments in modern sentencing
reforms have been a critical catalyst for forces contributing to modern mass
incarceration.
Though other contributors to this symposium provide a more thorough
critique of “limiting retributivism” in the MPCS revision,23 it is useful here
to briefly review the progressive origins of the rehabilitative ideal and the
progressive origins of its modern decline. In the nineteenth century,
progressives pioneered a move away from brutal physical punishments
toward the development of penitentiaries focused on the spiritual
rehabilitation of lawbreakers.24 And in the twentieth century, progressives
looked to advances in medicine and psychology to reinforce their
sympathetic view of criminal offenders as “sick” and their humanistic
commitment to sentencing schemes that employed the government’s
coercive power to help “cure” the patient.25
But progressives discovered that sentencing and corrections systems did
not in operation live up to society’s purportedly humane commitments, and
21. See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6 (detailing the array of forces leading to
incarceration increases); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1999) (same); MAUER, supra note 6, at 15–99 (same).
22. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); Id. §1.02(2) & cmts. and ills., at 1-8; Id. § 1.02(2), Reporter’s
Note, at 24-32.
23. See Michael H. Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751 (2009); Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61
FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009).
24. See generally David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 100, 111
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998) [hereinafter OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON]
(discussing the origins and development of prison systems and their commitment to the
rehabilitative ideal).
25. See generally Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 24, at 171, 188–96 (discussing the “new rehabilitative
thrust” in which enthusiasm for psychological treatment led to a new emphasis on a “therapeutic
model of rehabilitation”).
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they complained about the failure to devote sufficient resources to effective
corrections programming and about the tendency of rehabilitative ideals to
be corrupted in practice.26 In the 1960s and 1970s, especially as lawyers,
politicians, and activists became increasingly suspect about the efficacy of
rehabilitative efforts and increasingly concerned about individual rights
and equality of treatment in the criminal justice system, the paternalistic
and more pernicious facets of the rehabilitative model of sentencing and
corrections came under attack.27 Criminal justice researchers and scholars
began criticizing the unpredictable and disparate sentencing outcomes that
are inevitable when discretionary sentencing decisions are focused on
offender rehabilitation; structured sentencing regimes promising more
predictable and consistent punishments became more appealing to
academics and policymakers.28 And, during the early calls for repudiation
of the rehabilitative ideal and for increased focus on consistent sentencing
outcomes, many sentencing reformers suggested that a shift in sentencing
purposes and structures would result in an overall reduction of sentence
severity.29
But noble goals rarely ensure idealized outcomes, especially in the
administration of criminal justice systems. As jurisdictions abolished or
greatly limited discretionary parole opportunities and created structured
rules for sentencing decision-making, no cogent or even fully-conceived
sentencing theory filled the vacuum that followed the rejection of the
rehabilitative ideal. Practically speaking, much of the modern sentencing
reform movement came to function as an anti-movement. Jurisdictions
adopted structured sentencing laws and abolished parole not in an express
pursuit of a new sentencing theory, but rather just as a rejection of the
rehabilitative ideal.30 Though some often sought to justify longer prison
sentences with claims about deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, the
only clear and consistently tangible goals of many sentencing reforms were
26. See generally id. at 169 (discussing the international rehabilitative emphasis in prisons);
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 8–9 (1971) (arguing that
rehabilitative programs in American prisons have largely failed).
27. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895–97 (1990).
28. See generally id. (tracing the restructuring process that led to the restriction on judicial
discretion in sentencing laws); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267,
272–74 (1977) (arguing that judicial discretion causes disparity in sentencing but that fixed
sentencing will not solve all the disparity problems).
29. See generally FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 3 (1976); DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 2 (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 4 (1976).
30. See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11–13
(discussing how the modern sentencing revolution has been theoretically underdeveloped); see also
Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 279 (2005) (“The federal
guidelines have been demonstrably purpose-free.”).
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the repudiation of rehabilitation as the dominant theory of punishment and
the reduction of sentencing disparities that resulted from discretionary
sentencing practices.31
Despite the absence of any dominant, clear new sentencing theory,
modern reforms have gravitated toward one dominant, clear new
sentencing outcome: legislators, prosecutors, and judges have all regularly
and readily embraced terms of imprisonment as a default punishment.32
Unlike various punishment alternatives that might seem inconsistent with
certain sentencing theories, imprisonment has the ready appeal of always
being defensible in service to retributivism, incapacitation, or deterrence
and has the added convenience of being distributable in the readily
quantifiable units of months and years.33 In other words, even when
legislators, prosecutors, and judges were unsure about what exact purpose
punishment should serve, imprisonment terms had the virtue of always
seeming to serve some purpose. Moreover, prison punishments could be
distributed and compared in defined quantums so that those focused on
sentencing disparities could numerically assess whether seemingly similar
offenders were receiving similar sentences.
Stated slightly differently, despite (or perhaps because of) the absence
of an effective and informative guiding theory for modern sentencing
structures, jurisdictions reforming their sentencing systems have generally
recast the concepts, culture, and structure of sentencing decision-making
toward actors and factors that foster an imprisonment-first orientation and
more punitive sentencing impulses. Modern sentencing regimes have
principally shifted excessive power to ex ante sentencing rule-makers, like
legislatures and commissions, who necessarily focus on the perceived harm
of general offenses and who necessarily respond more to concerns about
crime rates being too high or particular sentences seeming too lenient.34
Further, the emphasis placed on the goal of sentencing uniformity has
profoundly diminished the authority or desire of ex post sentencing
decision-makers, such as prosecutors, judges, and parole officials, to focus
on the redeeming (often disparate) personal qualities of individual
offenders.
31. See Berman, supra note 30, at 11–13.
32. See, e.g., MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND END
MASS INCARCERATION (2005); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995) (highlighting the reliance on imprisonment in
penal policy).
33. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 391 (1995) (stressing forces leading to undue reliance on imprisonment as opposed to
other forms of punishment).
34. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. POL’Y REV. 93 (1999); Ronald F.
Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW & POL’Y 429,
437 (1998).
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Specifically, in nearly all jurisdictions throughout the United States,
legislatures and sentencing commissions came to embrace and enact
mandatory imprisonment terms for certain offenses and more severe and
rigid sentencing rules based on enhanced concerns about consistently
imposing “just punishment” and deterring the most harmful crimes.35
Particularly because legislatures and sentencing commissions make
decisions about crime and punishment ex ante, they necessarily think of
criminal offenders as abstract characters—the threatening figure of a killer
or sex offender or drug dealer—rather than as individuals. With a focus on
the most abstract horrors of criminal activity and the most vile versions of
criminal offenders, these ex ante sentencing judgments will always tend to
be more punitive in response to any real or perceived “crime problem.”
Moreover, most structured sentencing reforms have tended to formally
mandate (or at least informally encourage) prosecutors and sentencing
judges to focus principally on offense conduct.36 The move away from an
offender orientation was driven by understandable concerns about the
tendency for prosecutors and judges to show disproportionate leniency
toward favored individuals; in effect, this move has often operated to limit
judges’ ability to consider those aspects of a defendant’s life and
characteristics that have historically been thought to justify mitigating the
need for a harsh response to an offense.37
These modern sentencing dynamics have been on special display in the
federal criminal justice system over the last two decades. The United States
Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have
excessively focused attention on aggravating offense conduct and have
limited judges’ opportunities to consider mitigating offender
characteristics.38 Mandatory sentencing provisions and enhancement are
35. See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics,
58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280–83 (2005).
36. See id. at 280–85.
37. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) (lamenting that federal reforms had drained
sentencing of its humanity); John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs:
Discretion and Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551–52 (1993)
(discussing judicial complaints that federal sentencing reforms “have eliminated the human element
from the sentencing process”).
38. Tellingly, the first four steps in the sentencing process described in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual are concerned exclusively with offense conduct. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements § 1B1.1 [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Other provisions
declare that many potentially mitigating offender characteristics—such as a defendant’s education
and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, previous employment record, and family
and community ties—are either “not ordinarily relevant” or entirely irrelevant to whether a
defendant should receive a departure below the guideline sentencing range. See, e.g., U.S.S.G.
§§ 5H1.1–1.6 (providing that age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions,
physical condition, previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community
ties are “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
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triggered typically by quantifiable offense factors—e.g., a longer prison
term for certain drug quantities or certain monetary loss amounts or
possession of a firearm. These provisions necessarily diminish the
significance of less quantifiable offender characteristics in federal
sentencing.
Consequently, while important and largely progressive goals initially
fueled modern reforms in state and federal sentencing systems, emphasis
on the goal of sentencing uniformity has fueled a “leveling up” dynamic. In
most efforts to make sentences more uniform, new sentencing structures,
legal doctrines, and policy decisions have resulted frequently in legislatures
and sentencing commissions making disparately lenient sentences
consistently harsher, and have rarely encouraged or even allowed
prosecutors or judges to make disparately harsh sentences more
consistently lenient.
Of course, the MPCS revision does aspire to replace the rehabilitative
ideal reflected in the original MPCS with a modern theory of “limiting
retributivism.” However, as punishment theorists justifiably have
complained, this hybrid theory does not have all that much tangible content
to shape either ex ante or ex post sentencing judgments.39 The theory thus
seems unlikely to play a significant role in retarding the structural and
political forces that have driven modern incarceration increases over the
last three decades. The MPCS revision asserts that the most successful
modern sentencing jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, have followed the
theoretical and structural model it endorses; but so too have the least
successful modern sentencing jurisdictions such as the federal system.
Problematically, even the success stories within the modern sentencing
reform movement—the best practices which the MPCS revision avowedly
embraces and essentially seeks to codify—still reflect the modern tendency
to shift sentencing power to ex ante rule-makers who are likely to favor
punitive sentences and are likely to place undue reliance and emphasis on
quantifiable offense harms and quantifiable punishments like
incarceration.40 The MPCS revision and its Reporter make much of the fact
guidelines”); id. § 5H1.4 (providing that drug dependence or alcohol abuse “is not a reason for
imposing a sentence below the guidelines”).
39. See Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 621–34 (2003) (arguing forcefully against all
hybrid theories of punishment such as “limiting retributivism”); see also Edward Rubin, Just Say
No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 50 (2003) (offering the suggestion that, instead of
“retributive” limits on utilitarianism, the revised Code should speak in terms of “proportionality”
limits); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 87–89 (2003)
(arguing that the revised Code is too retributive); Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, The
Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 278, 278, 310 (2007) (reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1–4 (2005) and favoring retributive just
deserts approach over revised § 1.02).
40. This is one reason why, as developed more fully in Part IV, I find it troublesome that the
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that some states with well-functioning sentencing commissions have had
comparatively slower rates of prison growth than states without a welldesigned modern sentencing scheme.41 But slower movement in the wrong
direction is still movement in the wrong direction.
Against the backdrop of these modern realities, it is useful to look back
at just how the theoretical “assumptions that have fallen into uncertainty or
disfavor” in the original MPCS found expression in the particulars of the
Code. In particular, it is informative to review the ALI’s revised
commentaries to the original MPCS, which were written in the late 1970s,
just as structured sentencing reforms were gaining steam.42 Though nearly
thirty years old, these revised commentaries provide a timeless defense of
the essential commitments of the original MPCS; they also accurately
foreshadow many problems now seen in modern structured sentencing
systems. Because the revised commentaries so effectively highlight the
enduring and still timely wisdom of the original MPCS, let me quote at
length their discussion of the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) attitude toward
imprisonment in general, and toward long prison terms in particular:
The Code accords a substantial priority to sentences that do
not involve imprisonment. There is no offense as to which
imprisonment is absolutely required, except possibly murder.
It is conceived that even in respect to the most serious crimes
there may be cases that are so exceptional that some other
disposition is warranted; and it was feared that one
consequence of mandatory prison sentences is evasion
through plea bargaining over the offense charged. When the
court is deciding between imprisonment and withholding
imprisonment, it is to choose against imprisonment unless one
of the specified grounds justifying imprisonment is found. A
sentence not involving imprisonment avoids the poor
associations and uselessness that confinement brings; and it
can convey the community’s confidence that an offender can
live responsibly and give him a special incentive to do so. If
the offender is imprisoned, the parole board is directed to
release him when he is eligible for parole unless one of the
specified reasons for further confinement is thought to obtain.
When imprisonment sentences are to be imposed, there are no
legislatively established minima, except a one year minimum
for felonies . . . [and] the court generally is without power to
make certain that an offender will be imprisoned for an
extraordinarily long time. That consequence is in accord with
MPCS revision explicitly calls for all jurisdictions to charter a new ex ante sentencing body, a
sentencing commission, and also to abolish an old ex post sentencing body, the parole board.
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxxi & n.7
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I §§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 2 (1985).
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the Institute’s judgment that such a determination is
inappropriate at the time of sentencing . . . . [E]xcept for first
degree felonies, no ordinary offender can be kept in prison
longer than ten years, less good behavior time . . . [and] with
every felony sentence there will be considerable latitude for
the parole board to decide upon release before expiration of
the maximum.43
With all due respect to the MPCS revision, these statements cause me to
cheer more than any aspect of the new sentencing provisions. In particular,
the original MPCS’ bold and forceful commitment to imprisonment as a
last resort and least-preferred reality, both at the time of sentencing and at
all times thereafter, is a refreshing and needed perspective in an era of mass
incarceration and extreme punishment terms. A fitting sense of
inprisonment’s horrible human realities, not to mention its inefficacies, is
palpable in the original MPCS. In the MPCS revision, sentencing and
inprisonment has the feel of a technical government challenge, rather than
a necessary evil within a society committed to human liberty and personal
freedoms.
I do not mean to assert that the “cure” of modern sentencing reforms is
categorically worse than the diseases of older sentencing systems. But I do
mean to encourage reflection on the real possibility that, despite the very
best of intentions, the theoretical underpinnings, legal structures, social
policies, and political rhetoric of modern sentencing reforms have
contributed to the growth in prison populations and the extreme liberty
deprivations that have now become so common in American criminal
justice systems. More directly, I think the ALI should embark upon a
focused and progressive attack on modern incarceration realities. In my
view, the ALI should again advocate a fundamental and forceful
commitment to the concept of imprisonment as a last resort for offenders
and a least-preferred response to criminal justice problems.
IV. AS A MATTER OF STRUCTURE, THE MPCS REVISION SHOULD NOT
GIVE UP ON PAROLE BOARDS
In addition to advocating a new (and I fear problematic) theoretical
foundation for “model” sentencing systems, the MPCS revision also
embraces and promotes a significant change in the institutional actors
involved in sentencing decision-making. Specifically, the “central
institutional recommendation of the revised MPC is that every jurisdiction
should charter a permanent sentencing commission, or equivalent agency,
to perform the basic research and prescriptive functions”44 involved in the
43. Id. at 8–9.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Note to Article 6A, at 45
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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development and evolution of a presumptive guideline system. In addition,
by virtue of its call for the abolition of traditional parole, the MPCS
revision functionally advocates the elimination of parole boards as an
institutional player in the sentencing universe.45 Though the motivation and
apparent wisdom for these structural suggestions are easy to understand
given the MPCS revision’s sentencing theories and basic goals, the MPCS
seems too optimistic about the ability of sentencing commissions to
improve sentencing policies and practices, and too pessimistic about the
inability of parole boards to sentencing policies and practices.
Notwithstanding the MPCS revision’s pessimistic view of parole
boards, I accept and endorse the revision’s fundamental belief that a wellfunctioning sentencing commission can have a positive impact on
sentencing policies and practices in any jurisdiction. Because so many
aspects of sentencing law, policy, and practice are complicated, contested,
dynamic, and divisive, every jurisdiction can and should benefit from a
specialized and dedicated agency that is well-funded, well-staffed, and
well-positioned to monitor, assess, analyze, and report on system-wide and
case-specific sentencing issues and problems. Especially now that
administrative agencies have become a fundamental part of the structure of
government at the state level, it is difficult to make a serious argument
against the simple idea that a specialized sentencing agency should be part
of every jurisdiction’s criminal justice infrastructure. There can be much
reflection and debate over the ideal forms and functions of modern
sentencing commissions,46 but the MPCS revision advocates a commission
framework that seems as likely to be successful as any other basic model
(especially since jurisdictions can and will create commissions tailored to
local needs and customs).
While it is difficult to make a convincing argument against the basic
suggestion that jurisdictions charter some kind of permanent sentencing
commission or equivalent agency, it is also difficult to make a convincing
argument that modern sentencing commissions ensure that jurisdictions
only embrace and enact just and effective sentencing laws and policies.
Though the MPCS revision rightly documents all the good that sentencing
commissions are able to do, it does not directly confront the critical reality
that sentencing commissions have never proven especially effective at
decreasing incarceration rates even when jurisdictions clearly no longer
need and can no longer afford increased prison populations. Modern
sentencing history suggests that, at best, commissions can sometimes
defuse the punitive tendencies of other sentencing actors and thereby help
slow prison growth; at worst, commissions can sometimes support the
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum 1–31
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter’s Memorandum, in MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 1–31 (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 12, 2008).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 4 (2003).
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punitive tendencies of other sentencing actors and thereby further increase
incarceration rates.47
I believe the relative failings of sentencing commissions in this regard
is fundamentally a problem of institutional design. Even when constructed
in a “model” form, sentencing commissions will rarely possess the
effective legal tools or political power or the best institutional perspective
to reverse the distressing prison growth trends and extreme punishments
documented in Part I. Even the best commissions can really only provide
sentencing advice—principally system-wide policy advice to legislatures
concerning sentencing laws and case-specific guideline recommendations
to judges about sentencing outcomes (though perhaps also to prosecutors
and defense counsel). But actual sentencing decision-makers can and
frequently will want to ignore even the wisest advice from sentencing
commissions, whether because political calculations or gut instincts
suggest this advice may not be efficacious. Moreover, the advice given by
sentencing commissions must often compete for attention with contrary
advice and countervailing pressures that actual sentencing decision-makers
receive from various other sentencing advocates.
These problematic institutional and practical dynamics limiting the
positive impact of commission efforts, especially with respect to systemwide policy-making, have been especially prominent in the federal
sentencing system. Often at the urging of prosecutors, Congress has
repeatedly ignored or disregarded the advice of the United States
Sentencing Commission concerning the harms and injustices of statutory
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions48 and the unjustified and
disparate impact of sentencing distinctions between crack and powder
cocaine.49 Similarly at the state level, experience has repeatedly shown that
when legislatures or judges get caught up in a wave of political and public
excitement about certain types of crimes or criminals—such as the “three
strikes” mania from a decade ago or the sex offender panic currently
47. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The
Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973
(2006); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005).
48. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal
Criminal Justice System (1991); see also Julie Stewart, The Effects of Mandatory Minimums on
Families and Society, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37 (1999) (noting that “in 1991, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission issued a very important report on mandatory minimums, which was basically ignored
once it was published, even though it was well done”).
49. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy (2002); U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine
and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997); U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1995); see also Steven L. Chanenson, Booker
on Crack: Sentencing’s Latest Gordian Knot, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 551 (2006) (detailing
the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s repeated efforts to reform crack sentences and Congress’s
rejection of the Commission’s initial reforms and its repeated disinterest in responding to the
Commission’s recommendation).
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afoot—sentencing commissions are rarely able (and sometimes not even
willing) to wage an effective fight against the political forces and public
pressures calling for even harsher sentencing laws.50
One can hope that the new commissions advocated by the MPCS
revision will be more effective than old commissions at keeping in check
all the political and social forces leading to modern mass incarceration. I
am not particularly optimistic, especially since there is little reason to
expect that the model sentencing commission devised by the MPCS
revision will have unique new institutional powers or will be able to alter
modern political sentencing pressures. Moreover, as suggested by the
stunning statistics set forth in Part I, it is now no longer sufficient to
propose models that we simply hope can help halt increases in
imprisonment rates and extreme prison terms. At this juncture, it is
critically important that American jurisdictions start reversing prison
growth and reducing incarceration rates; however, there is little reason to
expect sentencing commissions will or even can be an effective
institutional actor for this critical mission.
Against this backdrop, the positive modern potential of parole boards
starts to come into focus. Parole boards generally have one central mission,
namely to decide when society is better served by allowing an offender to
serve the rest of his sentence outside, rather than inside, prison walls. As
back-end, ex post offender-oriented institutions, parole boards possess both
the effective legal tools and an ideal institutional perspective to reduce
incarceration rates and mitigate extreme punishments.
Of course, the modern history of parole board functioning is anything
but inspiring, in part because parole officials have often been subject to the
political pressures and other social and legal forces that have fueled the
punitive turn in other aspects of modern sentencing systems. Nevertheless,
the realities of modern mass incarceration—combined with my view that
we are long overdue to show a renewed respect for our nation’s historic
commitment to protecting individual liberty and limiting government
power in the criminal justice system51—lead me to the conclusion that we
50. See Wright, supra note 34, at 429 (detailing failure of sentencing commissions to impact
three-strike sentencing reforms pursued by state legislatures); see also Ohio Criminal Sentencing
Commission, Interim Report on Rape Penalties 2 (Oct. 2006) (noting that a single well-publicized
case led the Ohio General Assembly to quickly consider and approve bills without Commission
input); Chris Megerian & Mary Fuchs, NJ Maintains its Strict Drug Sentences Despite Changes
Elsewhere, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 31, 2009 (noting political forces that have prevented drug
sentencing reforms despite forceful reform advocacy from the New Jersey Commission to Review
Criminal Sentencing).
51. See generally Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First
Century Punishment Realities, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Online) (Dec. 8, 2008) (arguing that
many Founding Era principles are undermined by mass incarceration and the huge growth of
government structures devoted to criminal justice administration and suggesting that a “serious
commitment to originalist views on human liberty and personal freedoms and to our nation’s core
founding principles should lead many more modern constitutional scholars to spotlight and
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should now focus on improving the functioning of parole boards, rather
than just deciding to throw out the parole baby with the sentencing reform
bath-water.
I have recently written an article addressing why, and how, modern
sentencing commissions can and should play an active role in combating
mass incarceration and extreme prison terms,52 and my comments here
should not be read as a condemnation of the positive potential of effective
sentencing commissions. Still, in light of modern crime and punishment
realities, with crime rates generally on the decline and modern
incarceration rates historically high, it is critical now to take an “all hands
on deck” approach to the problems of mass incarceration and extreme
prison terms. Though I hope modern sentencing commissions proposed by
the MPCS will be committed to addressing the harms of mass
incarceration, I also believe that modern parole boards could, and should,
play an important institutional role in a truly “model” modern sentencing
system.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern sentencing and punishment realities frame and define my basic
reaction to the MPCS revision. In my view, the fact that the United States
has become the world’s leader in incarceration and other extreme
punishments is not merely a serious problem, but a national disgrace and
embarrassment. Because the MPCS revision fails to address directly what
is really broken in modern American sentencing and punishment systems,
it represents a missed opportunity for the ALI to be a positive and
progressive voice in the modern criminal justice arena. The ALI should
directly assail and seek to remedy modern injustices that have come to
define modern sentencing attitudes and practices.

rigorously question America’s modern incarceration explosion”), available at
http://www.hlpronline.com/Berman_HLPR_120808.pdf.
52. See Douglas A. Berman, Exploring the Theory, Policy and Practice of Fixing Broken
Sentencing Guidelines, 21 FED. SENT’G REP.182–85 (2009).
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